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DOES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
REQUIRE RELIGION TO BE CONFINED TO
THE PRIVATE SPHERE?
Kevin Pybas*
I. INTRODUCTION
A recurring theme in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is the claim that the First Amendment requires religion to
be confined to the private sphere.1 In the case that launched the
Supreme Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Everson v.
Board of Education,2 Justice Rutledge, dissenting from the Court’s
approval of the use of public funds to reimburse transportation costs to
families whose children attended Catholic schools, objected on the
ground that religion and religious schooling “is exclusively a private
affair.”3 Similarly, writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 where
the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for New Jersey and
Pennsylvania to supplement the salaries of teachers teaching secular
subjects in parochial schools, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the
“Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the
individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice. . . .”5 Thus,
the privatization principle, if it may be called that, seeks to deny religion
any role in public life.6

Department of Political Science, Missouri State University; University of Georgia,
Ph.D.; University of Tulsa, J.D.
1
See Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A “Privatization” Theory of Religion Clause Cases,
30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275 (1986); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the
Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and
the Privatization of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19 (1991). Bradley, as the title of his article
suggests, focuses on the way the Supreme Court has used the First Amendment to
minimize the role of religion in public life. Myers, on the other hand, focuses not only on
religion cases but also substantive Due Process Clause cases and the extent to which the
Court, or various members of it, have sought to limit the role of religious beliefs in
lawmaking. Garnett argues that the limitation on political speech and activities imposed
on religious institutions receiving tax exemptions wrongly communicates the message that
religion is purely a private matter.
2
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3
Id. at 53.
4
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5
Id. at 625.
6
Noting this, Justice Scalia once heatedly accused some of his colleagues of treating
religion like pornography, as “some purely personal avocation that can be indulged
entirely in secret . . . in the privacy of one’s room.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
*
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While the Supreme Court sought to restrict religion to the private
sphere through the first four decades or so of its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the Rehnquist Court has not followed suit, at least not in
public assistance cases.7 Instead, it has evinced an openness to religion
in public life not present in earlier decisions. Even so, a minority of
Justices on the Rehnquist Court remain firmly committed to the notion
that religion should be restricted to the private sphere. In Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,8 for example, Justice Souter fiercely objected to the
Court’s approval of the use of publicly funded tuition vouchers in
religious schools, proclaiming not only that the Constitution relegates
religion to the private sphere, but that religious freedom itself is partly
premised on the notion that religion be kept “relatively private.”9 Justice
Souter insists that the Establishment Clause banishes religion to the
private sphere in order to “guarantee the right of individual conscience
against compulsion, to protect the integrity of religion against the
corrosion of secular support, and to preserve the unity of political society
against the implied exclusion of the less favored and the antagonism of
controversy over public support for religious causes.”10
The aim of this Article is to critically examine the rationales upon
which the privatization principle rests: (1) respect for rights of
conscience, (2) protection of the health and vigor of religion, and (3)
preservation of social peace. I will argue that the reasons given in
support of the privatization claim are unpersuasive and that, indeed, the
7
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding an Ohio law providing
tuition assistance to students enrolled in religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000) (overruling parts of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977)) (upholding a federal law providing instructional materials, such as
library books, media materials, and computers, to religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) and Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)) (allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in
remedial and enrichment courses in parochial schools); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a public university does not violate the
Establishment Clause when it makes student activity funds available to various student
groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of neutral criteria);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-employed signlanguage interpreter to assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school); see
also Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no
constitutional violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state
vocational rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota law allowing parents to take a
tax deduction for school expenses, irrespective of whether their children attended public,
private, or parochial schools).
8
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
9
Id. at 716 (Souter, J., dissenting).
10
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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stated reasons hardly rise to the level of an argument. My argument is
not that Justice Souter and other Justices who wish to confine religion to
the private sphere are wrong to focus on the rights of conscience, the
potential for religion to become corrupted, or civic peace, but that they
do so abstractly, uncritically, and with little attention to the lived,
historical reality of religion’s involvement in the public sphere.
Approaching the question from such a high level of abstraction, I argue,
leads the “privatization” Justices to gloss over real issues of religious
liberty. Instead of a deep reflection on the most desirable relationship
between religion and government in the contemporary context of
pluralism and a far-reaching regulatory state, the privatization Justices
dogmatically insist that the Establishment Clause was intended to
confine religion to the private sphere. I do not deny that there are good
reasons why religion should in some circumstances be relegated to the
private sphere. However, the facile character of the claim that the
Constitution always requires it leaves the strong impression that the
privatization position rests not so much upon a careful sifting of
evidence or a thoughtful consideration of how religious liberty can be
advanced for all, but upon unexamined notions about how liberal society
can be made to work.
This Article is largely critical.
Thus, I do not explore the
philosophical commitments that seem to be embedded in the
privatization position.11 Nor do I try either to defend the Rehnquist
Court’s greater acceptance of religion in the public sphere or to
demarcate the appropriate boundary between religion and the state.
With these caveats in mind, Part II briefly summarizes current
Establishment Clause doctrine, highlighting the Rehnquist Court’s
different approaches to religious practices in government schools versus
public aid that benefits religious schools. The aim in Part II is not to give
a detailed account of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence or
to try to synthesize its various pronouncements on church-state issues.
Rather, it briefly describes important doctrinal changes the Rehnquist
11
In a companion essay in progress, I explore the extent to which the privatization of
religion interpretation of the Establishment Clause may be rooted in an understanding of
the liberal political tradition that regards religion and ways of life rooted in it to be inferior
to reason and the examined life. Kevin Pybas, Two Concepts of Liberalism in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 36 CUMB. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar., 2006). With a negative view of
religion as the starting point, the conclusion that the Constitution restricts religion to the
private sphere seems not so much the result of careful constitutional inquiry but as almost
foreordained from the outset. I also consider whether the Rehnquist Court’s qualified
acceptance of religion in the public sphere is rooted in a different understanding of the
liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it than that which strictly confines
religion to the private sphere.
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Court has fashioned regarding religion in the public sphere. As the
Court has become more open to religion in the public sphere, those
Justices committed to the privatization of religion have been moved to
explain more thoroughly their views as to why religion should be
confined to the private sphere.
Part III closely examines these
arguments, focusing on the rationales given in support of the
privatization commitment. While many Justices have been committed to
confining religion to the private sphere,12 I primarily focus on the
opinions of Justice Souter, who has more clearly argued the reasons why
religion should be confined to the private sphere. Part IV summarizes
and restates my criticisms of the claim that the Establishment Clause
restricts religion to the private sphere.
II. CONTEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Rehnquist Court draws a distinction between government
directly supporting or endorsing religion and the expenditure of public
funds in religious institutions upon the free choice of public aid
recipients. In situations involving the government in the direct support
of religion, the Rehnquist Court has not deviated from earlier judgments
expressing the unconstitutionality of such practices.13 For example, it
has invalidated a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary
theory in public schools and universities unless creation science was also
taught;14 placement of an unadorned Christian nativity scene inside a
12
Myers noted in 1991 that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
“consistently” sought to confine religion to the private sphere. Myers, supra note 1, at 79.
Among current Justices, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and of course Stevens do so as well. See
supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. Justice Breyer’s commitment to privatizing
religion seems to be context specific. For example, he joined Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Mitchell, approving of religious schools’ use of instructional materials purchased
with federal funds. 530 U.S. at 836 (O’Connor, J., concurring). However, he objected to the
tuition vouchers at issue in Zelman because they “differ . . . in both kind and degree from aid
programs upheld in the past.” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726. That is, he objected because the
vouchers “direct financing to a core function of the church: the teaching of religious truths
to young children” and because they involve “a considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from
public secular schools to private religious schools.” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726–27 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 173–76.
13
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (barring commencing the school day with a
moment of silence for either meditation or voluntary prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (forbidding schools from posting the Ten Commandments in school rooms);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking a state law prohibiting the teaching of
evolutionary theory in public schools and universities); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (forbidding commencing the school day with teacher-led Bible reading
and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (forbidding statesponsored nondenominational prayer in which student participation was voluntary).
14
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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county courthouse;15 clergy-led public school graduation ceremony
prayers;16 and student-led prayers at public school athletic events.17
While the rationales the Court gave for striking each practice included
the lack of a secular purpose,18 impermissible endorsement,19 and
governmental coercion,20 the problem was that each law or practice
involved the government in the direct support or sponsorship of
religion, which violates the Court’s interpretation that the Establishment
Clause requires governmental neutrality towards religion.
“Neutrality” was established as the constitutional benchmark for
church-state issues in Everson v. Board of Education,21 where the Court
declared that the Establishment Clause requires “the state to be a neutral
in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers. . . .”22 The meaning of “neutrality” is not self-evident, but in
the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman23 the Court synthesized its postEverson Establishment Clause rulings and famously declared that
government acts neutrally with regard to religion when its laws have
secular purposes, the primary effects of which neither promote nor
hinder religion and do not lead to an “excessive entanglement” of
religion and the government.24 Although the Lemon test was given as a
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
17
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
18
“In this case, appellants have identified no clear secular purpose for the [law].”
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585.
19
“[The county] has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of
endorsing a patently Christian message . . . nothing more is required to demonstrate a
violation of the Establishment Clause.” County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601–02.
20
“No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to
participate in a religious exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 599. “Even if we regard
every high school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary,
we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper
effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.” Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
21
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22
Id. at 18.
23
403 U.S. 602.
24
Id. at 612–13. The secular purpose test was drawn from Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), where the Court declared unconstitutional laws requiring
Bible reading without comment in the public schools at the beginning of each school day.
The primary effect test was first announced in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), where the Court affirmed a state law requiring local school districts to lend
textbooks without charge to parochial school students. The excessive entanglement prong
was first articulated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where the Court ruled
that tax exemptions for property owned by religious organizations used exclusively for
religious purposes do not violate the Establishment Clause.
15
16
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standard for Establishment Clause issues, it is not clear that it has made
much of a difference in the Court’s treatment of religious practices in
government institutions. For example, in the five post-Lemon cases the
Court decided involving religion in the public schools, Stone v. Graham,25
Wallace v. Jaffree,26 and Edwards v. Aguillard27 were decided on the basis of
a lack of a secular purpose, indicating that a three-part test is wholly
unnecessary for deciding these types of cases. The other two decisions,
Lee v. Weisman28 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,29 were
decided without resort to the Lemon test.30 The Lemon test was likewise
ignored in Marsh v. Chambers,31 where the Court ruled, relying mainly on
historical grounds, that state legislative chaplains do not violate the
Establishment Clause.32
While the Lemon test appears to have had little impact in cases
involving the government in the direct support of religion, it has
appeared more prominently in the Court’s effort to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible governmental aid to religious
institutions.33 To be sure, as in the religion-in-government cases, the
25
449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980) (forbidding schools from posting the Ten Commandments in
school rooms).
26
472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (barring commencing the school day with a moment of silence
for either meditation or voluntary prayer).
27
482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the teaching of
evolutionary theory in public schools and universities unless creation science was also
taught).
28
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
29
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
30
“Our decision in Lee v. Weisman, conspicuously avoided using the supposed [Lemon]
‘test’ . . . .” Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
31
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
32
Id. at 792.
33
See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no
Lemon violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state vocational
rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(forbidding, on entanglement grounds, the use of state and federal aid to employ public
school teachers in parochial schools for the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special
education courses); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (also forbidding, on
advancement grounds, the use of state and federal aid to employ public school teachers in
parochial schools for the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special education courses);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (finding no Lemon violation in a Minnesota law
allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs, irrespective of whether
their children attended public, private, or parochial schools); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (finding no Lemon violation in a state law
providing financial reimbursement to religious schools for the costs of state-mandated
testing and record keeping); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (authorizing statefunded standardized tests and scoring services and allowing state-employed speech and
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Court sometimes resolves public aid cases without invoking Lemon.34
More significantly, the 1997 decision of Agostini v. Felton35 explicitly
modified the Lemon test in two significant ways regarding its application
in aid-to-religion cases. First, the entanglement portion of the Lemon test
was folded into the effects prong of the test.36 The Court said of itself
and the Lemon test:
[T]he factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is
“excessive” are similar to the factors we use to examine
“effect.” That is, to assess entanglement, we have looked to
“the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and
the resulting relationship between the government and
religious authority.” Similarly, we have assessed a law’s
“effect” by examining the character of the institutions
benefited (e.g., whether the religious institutions were
“predominantly religious”) and the nature of the aid that
the State provided (e.g., whether it was neutral and
nonideological).37
Thus, in aid cases, Agostini reduces the Lemon test into a two-part
inquiry: whether the law has a secular purpose and whether its effect is

hearing therapists, counselors, doctors, and nurses to examine parochial school students on
school grounds, but forbidding public schools from loaning instructional materials to
parochial schools, on advancement grounds and disallowing the use of public funds for
field trip transportation for parochial school students, on entanglement grounds); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (allowing secular textbooks purchased with public funds to
be loaned to religious schools, but disallowing, on advancement grounds, the use of
instructional materials purchased with public money and prohibiting the provision of
auxiliary services, such as counseling and speech and hearing therapy, on excessive
entanglement grounds); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (striking a New York law on advancement grounds that provided various forms of
public assistance to private schools and families with children enrolled in them, most of
which were religiously affiliated); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (declaring
unconstitutional, on excessive entanglement grounds, state laws that supplemented the
salaries of teachers teaching secular subjects in religious schools).
34
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a
public university does not violate the Establishment Clause when it makes student activity
funds available to various student groups, including a student-run religious organization,
on the basis of neutral criteria); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (no
Establishment Clause violation in allowing a state-employed sign-language interpreter to
assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school).
35
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (partially overruling Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985) and overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
36
Id. at 232.
37
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted).
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the advancement of religion. Second, more significantly, is the way
Agostini unambiguously altered the inquiry into whether a law advances
religion. Prior to Agostini, advancement of religion had generally been
present if the aid provided could be used to support the religious
mission of the religious institution.
To this end, the Court generally drew a line between aid that it
believed could be limited in its use to secular purposes only and aid that
could not be so limited. Consequently, the Court permitted aid that
supplied things, such as secular textbooks38 and health and therapeutic
services,39 but not aid that was used to purchase instructional materials40
or to provide remedial and enrichment courses.41 However, in Agostini,
the Court noted that its rulings in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind42 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District43 had
called into question its project of categorizing aid either as secular or
religious. The more telling inquiry, the Court reasoned, was whether the
advancement of religion was attributable to the state or to individuals
exercising “genuinely independent and private choices.”44 Judgments
about whether a law provides genuine choice between secular and
religious alternatives, in turn, depend on whether “the aid is allocated on
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor[s] nor disfavor[s]
religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries
on a nondiscriminatory basis.”45 In other words, laws that provide
neutrally available public funds on the basis of secular criteria, such as
financial need, and that provide no incentives for recipients to choose
religious alternatives are nevertheless constitutional even when the
funds are used to further religion. In such instances, the “advancement
of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious
message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.”46
Agostini thus made it clear that the central inquiry in public assistance
cases was not whether aid could be limited to secular purposes. Rather,
the inquiry is whether funds directly further religion, which is forbidden,
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
40
Id.
41
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985).
42
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
43
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
44
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
45
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
46
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
38
39
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or whether religion is advanced by the free and independent choices of
aid recipients, which is acceptable.47
Agostini therefore seemed to clearly signal a certain acceptance on
the Court’s behalf of religion in public life that previous cases such as
Mueller v. Allen,48 Witters,49 and Zobrest50 had prefigured. The Court
confirmed its tolerance of religion in the public sphere in Mitchell v.
Helms,51 where it reversed course to permit the use of publicly-purchased
instructional materials, such as library books, media materials, and
computers, in religious schools. Moreover, the Court’s most recent aid
case ruling, that a state law providing tuition assistance to students
enrolled in religious schools does not violate the Establishment Clause,
would seem to solidify its current position on religion in public life. 52
What then can we say about the Rehnquist Court’s approach to
Establishment Clause issues? It seems its approach seeks not so much to
confine religion to the private sphere but to forbid the government’s
direct support of it. Religious practices in government, such as the
public schools, inescapably involve the government in the direct support
of religion. To avoid this, a majority of the Rehnquist Court continues to
insist that the Establishment Clause requires religion to be confined to
the private sphere. “The design of the Constitution,” Justice Kennedy
wrote for the Court in 1992, “is that preservation and transmission of
religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed
to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that
mission.”53 However, the support of religion present in religion-neutral
assistance programs in which individual aid recipients direct public
funds to secular and religious alternatives of their choosing is
attributable to individual choice, not to the government. In such
Thus, the Court in Agostini ruled that there is no constitutional prohibition to applying
public funds to remedial and enrichment courses in religious schools when such funds are
provided to all students meeting secular eligibility requirements when there is some
modest monitoring scheme in place to make sure that publicly-paid teachers do not engage
in religious instruction. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35. To this end, Agostini completely
overruled Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and partially overruled Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
48
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in a Minnesota law
allowing parents of all school age children to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs,
including parents whose children are enrolled in religious schools).
49
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
50
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
51
530 U.S. 793, 835–36 (2000) (overruling portions of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977)).
52
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
53
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
47
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circumstances, individual choice severs the link between government
and the advancement of religion. Yet, with religious practices in public
schools, there is no individual choice that can be exercised that would
cut the impermissible tie between government and the support of
religion. The support of religion present in this context thus seems
unavoidably attributable to government.
Focusing on the requirement that government act neutrally towards
religion helps illustrate the Court’s two-track approach to these issues. If
religious practices in governmental institutions necessarily involve
government in the advancement of religion, government has then failed
to act neutrally with regard to religion, which the Court has construed to
be the command of the Establishment Clause since Everson.54 To ensure
that government acts neutrally with regard to religion in terms of its own
practices, the Court has consistently insisted that religion be restricted to
the private sphere. But what does the principle of neutrality require
regarding neutrally available governmental assistance programs? Lemon
and its progeny typically ruled that the government had advanced
religion or acted non-neutrally towards religion when public funds were
spent in a way that could be used for religious purposes.55 The Court’s
movement away from classifying the aid in question as supporting either
the secular or religious aspects of a religious institution56 has led to a
reconceptualization of what neutrality means vis-à-vis neutral assistance
programs. As the majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris57
indicates, neutrality, understood as “evenhandedness” between religious
and secular alternatives, now appears to be the singular standard
employed by the Court for judging the constitutionality of aid programs
where public funds wind up in the treasury of religious schools.58 That
See supra text accompanying notes 21–22.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–41.
56
See supra text accompanying notes 41–47.
57
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
58
Id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing three different meanings the Court has ascribed to the
word “neutrality”: “as a term to describe the requisite state of government equipoise
between the forbidden encouragement and discouragement of religion; to characterize a
benefit or aid as secular; and to indicate evenhandedness in distributing it”). The plurality
opinion in Mitchell treated evenhandedness as the sole constitutional measure, a conclusion
criticized by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion and by Justice Souter in his
dissent. Id. at 837–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 869, 900 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that the plurality “espouses a new conception of neutrality as a practically
sufficient test of constitutionality that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate inquiry
into a law’s effects,” and the plurality “appears to take evenhandedness neutrality and in
practical terms promote it to a single and sufficient test for the establishment
constitutionality of school aid”). However, Justice O’Connor now appears to agree that
54
55
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is, so long as government assistance programs have a secular purpose
and neither define aid recipients on the basis of religion nor attempt to
steer recipients toward the religious alternatives by, for instance,
providing greater assistance to recipients who choose the religious
alternative, there is no violation of the neutrality requirement when
recipients themselves direct the funds to religious institutions.59
Four Justices, led by Justice Souter, argue that evenhandedness alone
is not an acceptable constitutional yardstick. Instead, evenhandedness
“is to be considered only along with other characteristics of aid, its
administration, its recipients, or its potential that have been emphasized
over the years as indicators of just how religious the intent and effect of a
given aid scheme really is.”60 On this view, even a genuinely neutral
public aid program61 that ends up subsidizing the religious mission of
religious schools through the free and independent choices of aid
recipients is unconstitutional.62 This is so, Justice Souter argues, because
public aid that supports the religious mission of a religious institution
violates “every objective supposed to be served by the bar against
evenhandedness alone satisfies the First Amendment, giving it precedential value that the
Mitchell plurality opinion could not. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669–70 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653–54.
60
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting).
61
It should be noted that Justice Souter denies that the voucher program at issue in
Zelman is neutral. In his view, the voucher program provides recipients with a financial
incentive to select religious schooling. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697–98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Zelman majority, on the other hand, concluded that the program provides financial
incentives for public schooling. Id. at 653–54 (majority opinion). The dispute as to whether
the voucher program provided incentives or disincentives for religious schooling is beyond
my interest here, but it is worth noting that the disagreement seems to turn on how to
count the amount of state funding available to students choosing to remain in public
school. Justice Souter focuses on the fact that the state of Ohio offers up to $2,250 tuition
assistance for students who opt out of the Cleveland public schools but only up to $324 in
tutoring assistance for the students choosing to remain in the Cleveland public schools,
which seemingly provides a financial incentive to opt out of public schooling. Id. at 697–98
(Souter, J., dissenting). However, the majority focuses on the fact that the amount of state
money going to Cleveland public schools, including community and magnet schools, is
two to three times more than can be paid to a religious school. Id. at 654 (majority opinion).
The majority also emphasizes that children choosing to remain in public school have no copay obligation but that families choosing private schooling are obligated to pay a portion of
the private school tuition, which creates an additional disincentive to choose religious
schooling. Id.
62
“[T]he basic principle of establishment scrutiny of aid remains the principle . . . that
there may be no public aid to religion or support for the religious mission of any
institution.” Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting). “[E]ven a genuine choice
criterion is [not] up to the task of the Establishment Clause when substantial state funds go
to religious [schooling]. . . .” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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establishment.”63 These objectives include “respect for freedom of
conscience . . . , sav[ing] religion from its own corruption,”64 and
“protecting the Nation’s social fabric from religious conflict. . . .”65 I now
wish to turn to an examination of each of these rationales underpinning
the privatization thesis.
III. THE PRIVATIZATION RATIONALES
As I noted at the outset, rights of conscience, the potential for
government to harm religion, and social peace are not inappropriate
objects of concern. However, the burden of this Part of this Article is to
illustrate the superficial character of the scrutiny Justice Souter and other
adherents of the privatization thesis grant these issues.
A. Freedom of Conscience
Justice Souter opposes the expenditure of neutrally available public
funds in religious schools on the grounds that Thomas Jefferson’s
Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom and James Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments “establish clearly
that liberty of personal conviction requires freedom from coercion to
support religion, and this means that the government can compel no aid
to fund it.”66
Specifically, Justice Souter cites Jefferson for the
proposition that neutrally available funds spent in religious schools
violate rights of conscience by infringing upon the principles that “no
one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever’“67 and that:
[C]ompelling a man to furnish contributions of money
for propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is
sinful and tyrannical; . . . even the forcing him to support
this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870–72 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that public support of religion “violates the fundamental principle of
freedom of conscience,” “corrupts religion,” and “is inextricably linked with conflict”).
65
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
67
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 84 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987)). The title of the document Justice Souter purports to be citing does not match the
page number he gives. Jefferson’s A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom is reprinted in the
Kurland and Lerner volume at page seventy-seven. On page eighty-four is the Virginia Act
for Establishing Religious Freedom. However, it makes no difference which document Justice
Souter intended to cite because the passages he relies on are in both documents.
63
64
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depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his
contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he
would make his pattern.68
Madison is cited for the belief that freedom of conscience is violated “by
any ‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence . . . of
his property for the support of any . . . establishment.’”69 Taken together,
Jefferson’s Act and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance establish that
“‘[a]ny tax to establish religion is antithetical to the command that the
minds of men always be wholly free.’”70
There are several possible objections to Justice Souter’s claim that
Jefferson and Madison authoritatively established that the use of
neutrally available public funds in religious schools amounts to
despotism over the mind. One objection I will note but not pursue is
Justice Souter’s belief that the outcome of the debate in Virginia in the
1780s over religious freedom, in which Madison and Jefferson played
such prominent roles, has constitutional status. This, of course, is not a
new claim71 and many objections have been raised against it.72 Suffice it
to say, given the “widespread and deep division[s]” 73 over the meaning
68
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947)).
69
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Memorial and Remonstrance ¶ 3,
reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65–66).
70
Id. (citation omitted).
71
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court declared that “the provisions of the
First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played
such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same
protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the [Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty],” originally written by Jefferson. 330 U.S. at 13. More recently, Justice
Souter has declared that Madison’s “authority on questions about the meaning of the
Establishment Clause is well settled.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72
See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995). In commenting upon the claim in the majority
opinion of Everson that the Establishment Clause has the same meaning as Jefferson’s
Statute for Religious Freedom, Smith notes that “the Court took no notice of the obvious
objection to imposing the Virginia policy on a constitutional provision that had an entirely
different wording and that was adopted by a different, and very differently composed,
body.” Id. at 46.
73
Daniel O. Conkle, Legal Theory: Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82
NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1133 (1988). Given the profound disagreement over the meaning of
religious freedom in the late eighteenth century, Conkle asks:
[H]ow could Congress and the ratifying state legislatures have reached
agreement on the [E]stablishment [C]lause? It was supported, after all,
both by separationists and by those who were committed to programs
of state-sponsored religion. These various political actors simply could
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of religious liberty in the late eighteenth century, it is exceedingly
unlikely that the men in Congress and the state legislatures that ratified
not have agreed on a general principle governing the relationship of
religion and government, whether it be the principle endorsed in
Everson or any other. If the [E]stablishment [C]lause had embraced
such a principle, it would not have been enacted.
Id. (citation omitted). Conkle goes on to argue that the Establishment Clause is simply a
jurisdictional statement making it clear that in denying Congress the authority to pass any
“law respecting the establishment of religion,” the Constitution had not withdrawn
legislative authority over religion from the states. Id. Similar arguments are made by
several scholars. Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ.
L. REV. 293 (2002). Carter insists that:
Surely the [Establishment] [C]lause means what it says, and no more
than that. At the moment of the founding, the majority of states had
official, state-supported, established churches, and all but two required
religious tests for public office. The states were not giving these
powers away. On the contrary, they wanted to protect their own
established churches from interference by the new national
government, and also wanted to prevent that national government
from establishing a church of its own.
Id. at 299; Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 13, 52–53 (1995) (“There is little doubt that the Establishment Clause, (quite apart
from its opening words ‘Congress shall make no law[s]’), was specifically intended to
preserve a freedom of action to the states while denying it to the national government.”);
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 233, 307 (1989) (“The language of the [Establishment] [C]lause was directed against
congressional creation of a national church or favoritism of one ecclesiastical sect over
another. Thus, its predominant intent was to protect state religious establishments from
national displacement.”). Smith notes that there was widespread support in America in the
late eighteenth century for the notion that religion was necessary for good republican
government, but there was sharp disagreement over whether government itself should
promote religion or whether religion should be left to private, voluntary initiatives. Smith,
supra note 72, at 19–22. Given this disagreement, Smith, like the authors noted above,
argues that the Establishment Clause is simply a jurisdictional statement but also insists
that the Free Exercise Clause is as well. Id. at 35–43. “Given the controversies that in fact
existed in the new nation over ‘Free Exercise’ issues, it seems most plausible to understand
the Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, as expressing a jurisdictional
decision to leave substantive issues [of religious freedom] to be resolved by the states.” Id.
at 42. However, Douglas Laycock argues that the federalism interpretation of the religion
clause is mistaken and that the Establishment Clause does in fact protect individual rights.
See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241–43 (2004); Douglas
Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 875, 885–94 (1986).
The claim that the Establishment Clause is simply a federalism provision intended to
prohibit Congress from interfering with state establishments raises a host of questions I
have not the space to address. For example, it calls into question the coherence of
“incorporating” the Establishment Clause against the states. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 677–80
(Thomas, J., concurring). Another question raised by the federalism claim is the extent to
which Congress could have moved against state establishments under some expressly
enumerated power in Article I.
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the First Amendment believed that they were writing into the
Constitution the views of Jefferson and Madison to the exclusion of all
others.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Establishment
Clause is simply a restatement of Jefferson’s and Madison’s views. The
question then is:
Do their views unmistakably establish that
governmental programs of the type at issue in Mitchell and Zelman
represent a tyranny over the mind? In other words, is “the command
‘that the minds of men always be wholly free’“74 violated when
government aid is spent in religious schools “‘only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of individuals’”?75 The first
difficulty one encounters in trying to answer this question involves the
not insignificant challenge of applying Jefferson’s and Madison’s
principles of religious liberty to a world quite different from the one in
which they were articulated. To give but one example—if an example is
needed—consider that the expenditures of the federal government for
the period 1789–1791 were $4,269,000,76 but by 2002 they had grown to
exceed $2 trillion.77 This says nothing of the growth of state and local
governments over this period78 nor of the exponentially increased reach
of all levels of government into the lives of citizens today. Because of the
great difficulty of computing the relative value of a dollar, it is difficult
to conclude, with any precision, just how much larger the federal
government is today as compared to 1791. The point, though, is that
given that Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on religious liberty were part
of a set of beliefs that also included belief in limited government, does it
make sense to invoke the former when we have rejected the latter?79

74
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 871 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 12).
75
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)).
76
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, PART 2 1115 (1976) (containing a table entitled “Outlays of the Federal
Government: 1789–1970”).
77
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. DOC. 108–45, at tbl. B-82 (2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/2004_erp.pdf.
78
Total state and local government spending in 2002 was about $1.4 trillion. Id.
79
Smith writes that:
[F]ollowing Locke, Jefferson’s views about religious freedom [] rested
heavily on a minimalist conception of the proper functions of the state.
That minimalist conception hardly commands a consensus today.
Hence, it is unclear why current judges or legal scholars should feel
entitled to invoke Locke’s or Jefferson’s conclusions about religious
freedom when they reject the premises from which those conclusions
were derived.
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I am not sure how to begin to answer the question. However, it
seems to me that some explanation is in order if someone wishes to
claim, as Justice Souter does, that Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles of
religious liberty unequivocally establish that the use of public funds in
religious schools by means of religiously neutral criteria and the
individual choices of aid recipients constitutes despotism over the mind.
Some explanation that would, at a minimum, attempt to explain why in
circumstances of an expansive bureaucratic state the indirect support of
religion—as in Mitchell and Zelman—is anymore “antithetical to the
command ‘that the minds of men always be wholly free’” than other
public expenditures to which people object.80 Perhaps Justice Souter is
right, that even in the modern regulatory state wherein government
spends few of the trillions of dollars it spends each year in a way that
fails to offend any number of people, indirect public support of religion
nevertheless represents a tyranny over the mind. Yet it behooves him to
explain how this is true. Unfortunately, Justice Souter and other Justices
committed to the privatization of religion convey not a hint of believing
that there is any complexity to the issue. The sprawling growth of the
government over the last two centuries and the enormous extension of
its reach into the lives of citizens is something that Justice Souter simply
does not note. For him and the other privatization Justices, the use of
neutrally available public funds in religious institutions amounts
straightforwardly to an establishment of religion that tyrannizes the
minds of citizens.
Having raised the question of whether the demise of limited
government undermines Justice Souter’s application of Jefferson’s and
Madison’s principles to invalidate the expenditure of neutrally available
public funds in religious schools, let us return to the substantive issue of
whether Jefferson’s Act and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance clearly
establish that the use of such funds in this way actually amounts to the
establishment of religion and, hence, to a tyranny over the mind.81
Smith, supra note 72, at 148–49 n.24.
80
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871.
81
Recall that in support of his claim that the expenditure of neutrally available public
funds in religious schools violates rights of conscience, Justice Souter invokes Jefferson for
the principle that “no one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place,
or ministry whatsoever’” and for the contention that:
[C]ompel[ling] a man to furnish contributions of money for
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical
. . . even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own
religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of
giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he
would make his pattern.
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Recent scholarship suggests that Justice Souter is wrong on this score, at
least regarding Madison and the Memorial and Remonstrance.
Vincent Phillip Muñoz argues that Madison’s central teaching of
religious liberty is that the state may not take “cognizance” of religion.82
In the Memorial and Remonstrance, after first arguing that religion is an
inalienable natural right, Madison writes that “therefore that in matters
of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”83 What
the “noncognizance” of religion requirement means, writes Muñoz, is
that the state:
[L]acks jurisdiction over religion. It may not take
authoritative notice of or perceive religion or the
religious affiliation of its citizens.
A government
noncognizant of religion, in other words, must be blind
to religion.
It cannot use religion or religious
preferences as a basis for classifying citizens. This is the
doctrinal teaching of the “Memorial and Remonstrance.”
The state, which is a product of the social compact
between men originally born in the state of nature, must
remain noncognizant of religion because religion is not
part of the social compact. Religion cannot be part of the
social compact because of the inalienable character of
man’s right to direct his religion according to conviction
and conscience.84
Under the noncognizance principle, government “must remain blind
to religion as such. It can neither privilege religion nor punish citizens
on account of their religion.”85 If Madison is the authoritative guide to
the Establishment Clause, as Justice Souter claims,86 a “Madisonian
approach to the First Amendment would utilize the straightforward rule
that the state must remain noncognizant of religion. No state actor or
See supra text accompanying notes 67–70. Madison is cited for the idea that freedom of
conscience is violated “by any ‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence
. . . of his property for the support of any . . . establishment.’” See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
82
Vincent Phillip Muñoz, James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 17, 22–23 (2003).
83
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONST. 82 (1987).
84
Muñoz, supra note 82, at 23.
85
Id. at 29.
86
See supra note 71.
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government policy could classify, punish, distribute, or withhold
benefits from individual citizens or organizations on account of religion
or religious affiliation.”87 In other words, the Constitution must be
“religion-blind.”88
Muñoz’s interpretation of Madison’s claim that religion is “wholly
exempt” from the state’s “cognizance” is supported by Vincent Blasi.
Like Muñoz, Blasi argues that Madison’s principle of noncognizance of
religion means that the state has no “jurisdiction” over religion or
“responsibility” for it.89 As Blasi explains, the noncognizance principle
means that the state “has no authority to attempt to influence, facilitate,
or promote . . . [religious] beliefs and practices. That responsibility
belongs exclusively to the individual believer and the voluntary
associations he forms.”90 Moreover, for Madison, the state’s failure to
respect the noncongnizance principle meant that it had established
religion. Blasi contends that a “religious establishment,” according to
Madison, was “any instance of government taking ‘cognizance’ of, that is
responsibility for, religion.”91 Blasi argues, in other words, that
Madison’s notion of the separation of church and state did not seek to
confine religion to the private sphere. Rather, Madison believed it was
necessary to deny government any authority over the religious beliefs of
citizens. As Madison wrote in the Memorial and Remonstrance, “[t]he
Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate . . . . It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”92
Separation of church and state for Madison then requires “a separation

87
Muñoz, supra note 82, at 29. Muñoz claims only that the noncognizance approach to
religion represents Madison’s view, not that it also represents the intent of the men who
ratified the First Amendment. Id. at 29 n.38.
88
Id. at 29. In the Free Exercise Clause context, Muñoz argues that the principle of
noncongizance “prohibits the government from making laws that single out a religion or
religion generally for unfavorable treatment. It would also deny the government the
authority to make laws or exemptions singling out a religion or religion generally for
favorable treatment under the law.” Id. at 31. Muñoz thus concludes that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990), declaring that the Free
Exercise Clause does not exempt religious individuals and groups from laws of general
applicability that incidentally burden religion, is consistent with Madison’s noncognizance
principle. Muñoz, supra note 82, at 31.
89
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 789 (2002).
90
Id. at 790.
91
Id. at 791.
92
Madison, supra note 83, at 82.
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of functions and purposes, not some quixotic attempt to achieve a
hermetically sealed spatial separation.”93
Applying the noncognizance principle to issues that the Supreme
Court has decided helps illustrate the Madisonian approach. For
example, Muñoz persuasively makes the case that the Court violated
Madison’s principle in Marsh v. Chambers,94 upholding the
constitutionality of publicly-funded legislative chaplains, and in Walz v.
Tax Commissioners of New York City,95 finding no constitutional violation
in granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for
property used solely for religious worship. Both conclusions violate the
noncognizance principle in that government took “authoritative notice of
religion.” Marsh violated the noncognizance principle in that the hiring
of a chaplain involves a hiring based on religion and the chaplain’s
prayers promote a religious exercise. The same is true in Walz because
the Court conferred a benefit on the basis of religion.96 By the same
token, Muñoz argues that the decisions removing official religious
practices from the public schools are consistent with the principle of
noncognizance in that government, quite obviously, takes note of
religion when it promotes religious activities.97
Moreover, Muñoz convincingly contends that “[t]he principle of
‘noncognizance’ . . . forbids the state from using religious affiliation to
exclude individuals or organizations from generally available benefits.”98
To this end, Muñoz argues that the Court’s decisions in Mueller v. Allen99
and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia100 were
consistent with the Madisonian approach. The law at issue in Mueller
entitled all families with children enrolled in elementary and secondary
schools to take a tax deduction for education expenses, which benefited
families enrolled in religious schools. However, because the tax
exemption was available to all families with school-age children, the law
“did not inquire into the religious character of the child’s school,” which
meant that “the state remained noncognizant of religion.”101 However,
in Rosenberger, the University of Virginia did take cognizance of religion

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Blasi, supra note 89, at 791.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Muñoz, supra note 82, at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Muñoz, supra note 82, at 30.
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by inquiring into the religious character of student groups that applied
for student-activity funds that were available on the basis of nonreligious
criteria. The Supreme Court declared the policy unconstitutional
because it violated the free speech rights of a Christian student
organization, but as Muñoz argues:
A Madisonian interpretation of the First Amendment
would have reached the same result on the grounds that
to deny a student newspaper generally available
newspaper funds because their paper contains religious
content subjects religious students to a particular
disability. The university became unconstitutionally
cognizant of religion by singling out religious activities
for exclusion from generally available funds.102
In other words, once the university chose to fund student newspapers, in
order to remain “blind to religion,” it could not inquire into the religious
character of the newspapers. Regarding the issue of public funds going
to religious schools, Muñoz argues that:
[T]he Madisonian approach would adjudicate the issue
like any other policy of governmental funding. The
government may not use religious affiliation as a
classification or criterion for either privilege or penalty.
The government may not fund schools because they are
religious, but it also may not fund schools only because
they have a religious affiliation. If the government
chooses to adopt a general policy to fund educational
programs in public and private schools, it may not adopt
standards that take religion into account.103
The “religion-blind” requirement, as Muñoz notes,104 supports the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the religious schooling context,
permitting the use of a publicly-funded sign-language interpreter by a
student enrolled in a Catholic school,105 publicly-funded teachers
teaching enrichment and remedial courses in religious schools,106 loaning
instructional materials purchased with public money to religious

102
103
104
105
106
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Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993).
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schools,107 and religious schools’ participation in a publicly-funded
voucher program.108 If religious interests had been denied the ability to
participate in general funding programs, as Justice Souter would have
done in pursuit of the privatization of religion,109 the Court would have
imposed a particular burden on religion, which the noncognizance
principle forbids.
Blasi focuses only on the issue of religious school vouchers, and he
too concludes that they do not violate Madison’s principle of
noncognizance. That is, vouchers do not “place the state in the position
of taking responsibility for the religious beliefs of its citizens.”110 Blasi
writes:
There are secular educational objectives served by a
voucher system that are not bound up with the religious
beliefs of its participants. Even when those secular
educational benefits are delivered by religious authority
figures, acting out of religious motives and functioning
in a “pervasively sectarian” environment, the state has
not adopted an educational strategy that gives it a stake
in the religious beliefs of its citizens.111
In the cases Muñoz analyzes, the Supreme Court did not claim to be
following Madison’s principle of noncognizance. However, it seems that
its analysis in aid cases is now essentially a “noncognizance” inquiry.
That is, Zelman makes clear that public assistance laws pass
Establishment Clause scrutiny so long as they have a secular purpose
and neither define recipients on the basis of religion nor attempt to direct
recipients to religious alternatives, even when significant amounts of
public money end up in religious schools.112 The secular purpose
requirement and the requirement to distribute aid on the basis of
nonreligious criteria are investigations, under the modified Lemon test,
into whether the government has acted neutrally with regard to

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835–36 (2000).
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
109
See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240 (Souter, J., dissenting); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 14
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Souter).
110
Blasi, supra note 89, at 790. However, Blasi notes that Madison raises other issues in
Memorial and Remonstrance that may lead one to reject religious school vouchers. Id. at 787–
88.
111
Blasi, supra note 89, at 790.
112
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
107
108
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religion.113 Asking whether a law is neutral or evenhanded114 is also to
ask whether the state has taken congnizance of religion. Nonneutrality
indicates cognizance of religion, which denotes an establishment of
religion in Madisonian terms and is prohibited. In the public assistance
cases, then, the Court now seems to perform basically a Madisonian
noncognizance inquiry. If Muñoz’s interpretation of Madison is correct,
there is more than a little irony in Justice Souter’s dogged insistence that
the Court has betrayed Madison in its recent public assistance
pronouncements. Instead, it is his use of religious affiliation as a
classification for penalizing citizens that contravenes Madison’s principle
of religious liberty.
In addition to questioning Justice Souter’s rather simplistic
understanding of Madison and Jefferson, let us consider more directly
the concept of “freedom of conscience.” Irrespective of the best reading
of Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles, it seems strange to claim that my
rights of conscience are violated when others are permitted to share in a
governmental resource that they also have contributed to and from
which I already have drawn. For example, my family resided in the
State of Ohio earlier this decade when the Cleveland voucher program
was in place and when the Court decided Zelman. In the year following
the Zelman decision, the 2002–2003 academic year, my children and over
1.8 million other children were enrolled in Ohio elementary and
secondary public schools.115 By contrast, at that time about 4,200
students in the Cleveland district were using their education vouchers in
religious schools.116 Justice Souter claims that such expenditures violate
the rights of conscience of all citizens of Ohio. But in what sense were
my rights or the rights of anyone violated by the use of vouchers in
religious schools? The vouchers support education,117 not a minister,
missionary, or the like. No one’s taxes were increased in order to
channel money to religious schools. The state’s claim on me, such as my
tax obligation, was the same whether religious schools participated in
the voucher program or not. Furthermore, the use of voucher funds in
religious schools did not interfere with my family’s—nor would I argue
See supra text accompanying notes 36–47.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
115
Ohio Department of Education 2004–2005 Fact Sheet, at http://www.ode.state.oh.us/
faq/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
116
Amy Hanauer, Cleveland School Vouchers:
Where the Students Go (2002), at
http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/WhereStudentsGo.pdf.
117
“There is no dispute that the program challenged here was enacted for the valid
secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably
failing public school system.” Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
113
114
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with anyone else’s—ability to live by our own best lights, that is,
according to the beliefs and values that give meaning and purpose to our
lives, that which makes our lives our own.
In other words, it seems to me that to find a genuine infringement of
rights of conscience there must be some real interference with what the
political philosopher William Galston calls “expressive liberty.” Galston
defines this concept as “[t]he ability of individuals and groups to live in
ways consistent with their understanding of what gives meaning and
purpose to life. . . .”118
Governmental interference with rights of
conscience denies individuals and groups the right to define how they
would live. It is to compel others to live in a way they would not live
but for the governmental compulsion.119
What Galston’s discussion of freedom of conscience suggests is that
there has been no violation of rights of conscience and expressive liberty
unless government meddles into the lives of citizens in a way that
interferes with their ability to live according to their own best lights. To
this end, Galston argues that compulsory flag salute and Pledge of
Allegiance laws that require some citizens to violate their religious
beliefs are forbidden infringements upon conscience.120 Such laws
interfered, without a compelling governmental interest, with the ability
of Jehovah’s Witnesses to live and raise their children according to the
dictates of their consciences. It is precisely this element of interference
with one’s way of life that is missing from Justice Souter’s claim that the
use of neutrally available public funds in religious schools violates rights
of conscience. As I stated, the expenditure of public funds in religious
schools by means of neutral governmental programs involves absolutely
no interference with the ability of citizens to live according to their own
best lights. One may believe that funding programs such as those at

118
William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty and Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Freedom
of Conscience, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 149, 177 (2003).
119
Galston does not claim that the right of expressive liberty is an unlimited right, for as
he adds “[i]t may rightly be limited, but only to the extent necessary to secure the
institutional conditions for its exercise.” Id. While freedom of conscience and expressive
liberty may at times be legitimately curtailed, they “enjoy[] a rebuttable presumption to
prevail in the face of public law.” Id. at 176. That is, “‘governmental infringements upon
. . . conscientious claims would be sustainable in court only if it were shown that they were
necessary for compelling governmental interests.’” Id.
120
Id. Galston focuses on Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), where
the Supreme Court affirmed the right of public schools to expel Jehovah’s Witness students
who refused to say the pledge and salute the flag on religious grounds. Minersville was
overruled on free speech grounds in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
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issue in Zobrest, Agostini, Mitchell, and Zelman are unwise, even foolish,
but they in no way impair one’s ability to believe and live as one sees fit.
One is free to continue believing or not believing whatever one does
about God and to continue worshiping or not worshiping God in the
same way as before the institution of the programs. Likewise, one is free
to continue raising children as before, to pursue what one values, and to
set and follow one’s life plan. In short, it is difficult to understand how,
per Justice Souter, rights of conscience are violated when neutrally
available public assistance is routed to religious schools by the
independent choices of aid recipients.
A critic might object that Justice Souter is merely relying on the
authority of Madison for his claim about rights of conscience and that
my real quarrel is with Madison. However, as the discussion of Muñoz’s
and Blasi’s interpretations of the Memorial and Remonstrance suggests,
religion-neutral government programs are not instances of government
taking congnizance of, or responsibility for, religion.121 If this is the case,
it would then follow that such programs do not impair rights of
conscience. Considering the Memorial and Remonstrance in the light of
Galston’s concept of expressive liberty buttresses this conclusion. Recall
that Madison wrote the Memorial and Remonstrance in response to Patrick
Henry’s A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teacher’s of the Christian Religion.
As the title of the bill suggests, Henry was proposing a property tax to
explicitly fund the teaching of Christianity.122 Had Henry’s bill become
law, it would have violated Madison’s injunction against government
taking congnizance of religion and clearly hindered the “ability of
individuals and groups to live in ways consistent with their
understanding of what gives meaning and purpose to life. . . .”123 We
need not speculate on just how much Henry’s bill would have interfered
with the liberty of various Christian groups or denominations, for it
plainly would have violated the expressive liberty of non-Christians,
who would have been taxed for the support of a faith not their own.
Requiring non-Christians to support Christianity undeniably interferes
with their ability to live in a way that reflects their judgments about what
gives value and meaning to their lives. Henry’s bill was thus unlike
contemporary government assistance programs in which individuals are
not taxed for the support of religion but for the provision of legitimate

121
122
123
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governmental services such as educational and disability services.124 In
Madisonian terms, government has not taken cognizance of religion.
Justice Souter claims, mantra-like, that the outlay of neutral public
funds to religious schools violates freedom of conscience. He makes this
assertion as though the claim alone were a trump. Even if we assume,
with Justice Souter, that the First Amendment embodies Jefferson’s and
Madison’s views to the exclusion of all others, he fails to explain why we
should accept their views on the relationship between church and state
when we have rejected their views on the proper scope of the latter.125
Furthermore, Muñoz’s and Blasi’s writings on the Memorial and
Remonstrance provide strong reason to doubt that Justice Souter has
correctly understood Madison’s principles of religious liberty.126 Finally,
I have suggested that in order to establish an actual violation of rights of
conscience, there must be some denial of what Galston calls expressive
liberty, which is absent in the neutral funding cases.127
B. Saving Religion from Its Own Corruption
The second reason Justice Souter gives in support of the claim that
the Constitution confines religion to the private sphere is that the First
Amendment aims also to protect the purity of religion from corruption.
Like his claim about freedom of conscience, Justice Souter’s argument
about protecting religion from corruption rests upon Madison’s Memorial
and Remonstrance. One of the reasons Madison opposed Henry’s bill was
his belief that “ecclesiastical establishments” corrupted “the purity and
efficacy of Religion” by producing “pride and indolence in the Clergy,
ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution.”128 Justice Souter does not claim that the threat today to the
purity of religion is quite the same as in Madison’s day. Instead, he
argues that the integrity of religion is threatened by “corrosive
secularism” that jeopardizes the ability of religious schools “to educate
the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their
faith.”129 His concern is that government regulations accompanying
public funds will undermine the particular identity of religious schools
that receive public funds. That is, the corruption of religion that Justice
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 74–80 (emphasis added).
126
See supra text accompanying notes 82–114.
127
See supra text accompanying notes 115–24.
128
Madison, supra note 83, at 83. Justice Souter quotes a portion of Article 7 of Memorial
and Remonstrance in Zelman. 536 U.S. 639, 712 (2002).
129
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 712.
124
125
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Souter believes the Establishment Clause protects against constitutes the
compromises the faithful might make with their own beliefs in order to
qualify for public funds. He cites the voucher program at issue in
Zelman, which prohibits religious discrimination and prevents
participating religious schools from favoring students of the school’s
faith in the admissions process.130 Justice Souter speculates that the
prospect of additional state funding may ultimately lead religious
schools to exchange their relative independence and particular identities
for increased public money.131
That religious beliefs and identities might be undermined by the
acceptance of public funds is certainly a valid concern, and it is a topic
that deserves more attention than I can devote here. However, several
points are worth noting. First, one doubts that Justice Souter and other
adherents of the privatization thesis truly grasp the problem that an
expansive regulatory state presents to religious believers who wish to
safeguard the integrity of their faith. For example, does not the state’s
monopoly on education funds exert substantial pressure on the religious
to compromise their beliefs? As Eugene Volokh has observed:
[M]any religious parents object on religious grounds to
many aspects of the curriculum and environment in
government-run public schools. The offer of a free
education in government-run school[s] puts these
parents to the choice of (1) taking this government
subsidy and compromising their religious objections to
the curriculum or environment or (2) sticking by their
beliefs but losing the subsidy. . . .132
The prevalence of religious schools in this country indicates that many
families are unwilling to compromise their religious beliefs. However,
the inability to afford religious schooling undoubtedly leads many
religious parents to accept the subsidy and compromise their beliefs.133
If the Establishment Clause is intended to prevent states from
placing individuals in a situation in which they will be tempted to
Id.
Id. at 715.
132
Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 341, 364 (1999).
133
On a related point, Justice Stevens has gone so far as to suggest that public schooling
should be an instrument for educating children away from inherited religious beliefs. Bd.
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
130
131
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compromise their religious beliefs, as Justice Souter maintains, then it
would seem that public schooling itself violates the Establishment
Clause. If the threat of secularism to religious belief is the concern, how
much more of a threat must this be in the context of public schooling,
given its pervasively secular character? Thus, denying parents the
option of spending neutrally available education funds in religious
schools would hardly begin to remedy the problem the secular state
presents to the integrity of religious belief. In short, concern that
governmental policies may lead individuals to compromise their
religious beliefs must also concede that the existing structure of
schooling already leads to just this result.
While Justice Souter ignores the more widespread threat to religious
belief that secular public schooling presents, the possibility nevertheless
exists that legislatures will permit families to direct neutral educational
funds only to religious schools willing to bend their religious beliefs. As
Justice Souter points out, for example, religious schools participating in
the Cleveland voucher program cannot favor students of the schools’
faith in the admissions process.134 Although this relatively mild
qualification does not interfere with religious instruction in the schools,
one wonders if the Supreme Court itself is not mainly responsible for
restrictions of this type and for more onerous ones like the Milwaukee
voucher program, where religious schools are forbidden from requiring
voucher students to participate in religious activities.135 That is, the
Court’s many Establishment Clause pronouncements have not provided
clear guidance for legislatures. And until its decision in Zelman, the
constitutional fate of vouchers was unsettled.
Perhaps the limitation on religious schools in Cleveland and
Milwaukee were simply good faith efforts by policymakers, given the
state of law at the time, to structure the scholarship programs in a way
most likely to ensure that they passed the inevitable constitutional
scrutiny. In other words, it is not clear that legislatures will inevitably
seek to undermine the religious identity of religious schools.136 This is
See supra text accompanying note 130.
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
136
One might argue, in fact, that some legislatures have been far more sensitive to
religious identity and diversity than the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court
has rejected legislative attempts to accommodate the needs of religious children. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687 (striking a New York law creating a school district for the public education of
handicapped children of the Satmar Hasidic sect); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(forbidding the use of state and federal aid to employ public school teachers in religious
schools for teaching remedial, enrichment, and special education courses); Grand Rapids
Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (also forbidding the use of state and federal aid to
134
135
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especially so given that the Zelman decision itself does not appear to
require religious schools to be so hamstrung as a condition for
participating in neutral public programs. Zelman clarifies that when
recipients of neutral public aid direct that aid to religious schools, the
promotion of religion is attributable to the free and independent choices
of the recipients, not to the state.137 Thus, there appears to be no
Establishment Clause requirement that religious schools trim their
principles in order to participate in neutral funding programs.138
Finally, one must note the off-putting paternalism present in Justice
Souter’s claim that the Establishment Clause prohibits the participation
of religious schools in neutral public programs to protect the integrity of
religion. An expansive regulatory state presents a real danger to the
vitality of religious belief, but, as I have suggested, prohibiting religious
employ public school teachers in religious schools for teaching remedial, enrichment, and
special education courses); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (forbidding public
schools from loaning instructional materials to religious schools, and prohibiting religious
schools from using public funds to cover field trip transportation costs); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (forbidding government-owned instructional materials to be loaned to
religious schools, and prohibiting the provision of state-funded auxiliary services, such as
counseling and speech and hearing therapy); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 757 (1973) (striking a New York law that provided various forms of
public assistance to secular and religious private schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (invalidating state laws that supplemented the salaries of teachers teaching secular
subjects in religious schools); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (objecting to
religious schools using instructional equipment and materials purchased with government
funds); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (objecting to publicly-funded remedial,
enrichment, and special education in religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14–21 (1993) (Blackmun, O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (objecting to a stateemployed sign-language interpreter assisting a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic
high school). This is not to deny that legislatures may sometimes act oppressively against
religion. However, such treatment of religion could not be justified by claiming that the
Establishment Clause requires it.
137
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
138
While Establishment Clause concerns do not seem to be a valid basis for requiring
religious schools to alter their principles as a condition for participating in neutral public
programs, there nevertheless may be valid public policy concerns justifying the exclusion
of a religious school from neutral public programs because of the school’s religious
principles. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (affirming the
Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code to deny tax-exempt
status to religious colleges and secondary and elementary schools that practice racial
discrimination). It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the question of whether
public policy concerns may entitle the state to deny religious schools the ability to
participate in neutral public programs. Consequently, I do not address the extent to which
the state may burden religion by means of religiously neutral laws. See Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (finding no Free Exercise Clause violation in a neutrallyapplicable state criminal law that burdened the religious practices of the Native American
Church).
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schools from participating in neutral public programs hardly begins to
address the issue.139 More fundamentally, Justice Souter’s position
appears to presume that the faithful cannot be trusted to preserve their
religion and that Supreme Court Justices care more for the faith of the
religious than do the religious themselves. I do not doubt the
genuineness of Justice Souter’s concern over the threat that “corrosive
secularism” poses for religious belief. However, I do question the
presumption that the faithful cannot be trusted to safeguard their faith
and thus that it is the responsibility of political elites to guard it for them.
Putting aside the reasonableness or constitutionality of legislatures
requiring religious schools to relax their religious principles in order to
participate in neutral public programs, if religious communities are
willing to abide by the terms legislators have established for such
programs, should not their decision be respected? Are not the faithful
themselves in a much better position to judge the threat, or lack of threat,
to their religion that accompanies participation in government
programs? A religious community might, of course, misjudge and find
that participation does jeopardize its beliefs and integrity, but Justice
Souter might also misjudge and see a threat where one does not exist.
Upon recognizing that participation does tug too sharply towards
secularism, a religious school or community would, presumably, be free
to withdraw from the program. However, how is the error corrected
when religious schools are denied the opportunity to participate in
neutral public programs on the mistaken belief that the exclusion is
necessary to safeguard the purity of religion?
A critic might concede that the Supreme Court’s paternalism will at
times be mistaken and that it will “protect” religion when no protection
is required, but nevertheless respond that the stakes are too high for the
Court to avoid paternalism. In other words, protecting the purity of
religion, or religious pluralism,140 outweighs the interest that religious
communities have in deciding whether to accept the terms being offered.
It is better to have a blanket prohibition to safeguard all religion, one
might argue, even if the protection is unnecessary in some cases.
However well-meaning this position is, we still must ask whether heavyhanded paternalism is warranted. I believe it is not. I see no basis for
the presumption that religious communities cannot protect themselves.
Participation, individually and institutionally, in neutral governmental
programs such as the Cleveland voucher program, is voluntary. It is not
See supra text accompanying notes 132–33.
See Blasi, supra note 89, at 796 (discussing Madison’s belief in “the value of religious
pluralism”).

139
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a case of the state commandeering the religious schools and forcing their
participation.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, should we not assume
that these schools agreed to participate, fully aware of the terms of the
program, on conditions that they presumably found acceptable? How
religious schools in Milwaukee responded to the opportunity to
participate in that city’s voucher program is instructive. The Milwaukee
program prohibits religious schools from requiring voucher students to
participate in religious activity.141 Many religious schools declined to
become voucher schools on the grounds that the restriction would
interfere with their religious mission.142
However, other schools
concluded that the constraint poses no threat to their religious mission
and thus accept voucher students.143 As long as religious institutions are
not obligated to participate in public programs, which would likely
violate the Free Exercise Clause, and as long as they are free to withdraw
from such programs, I see no reason why the judgment of Supreme
Court Justices should prevail over the judgments of the religious
themselves. In any case, the experience of religious schools eligible to
participate in Milwaukee’s voucher program seems to confirm that
religious officials are capable of judging for themselves the threat that
participation in government programs poses for their religion and
institutions.
A related reason for rejecting Justice Souter’s paternalism is that he is
doing the very thing the Supreme Court has forbidden in other contexts.
That is, in arguing that the religious schools participating in Cleveland’s
voucher program have compromised their beliefs by accepting the
preference restriction,144 Justice Souter is making judgments about
whether a religious community’s beliefs are consistent with particular
religious doctrines. However, the decision in Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church145 prohibits judicial
excursions into theology, as the Court declared that it was
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
Joe Loconte, Paying the Piper: Will Vouchers Undermine the Mission of Religious Schools?,
93 POL’Y REV. 30 (1999). The principal of one Lutheran school explained that his school’s
unwillingness to participate in the voucher program was due to the restriction, which
school authorities believed “would compromise [the school’s] mission as a Christian
school.” Id. at 31. Loconte notes that a nationwide survey of private schools conducted in
1998 by the U.S. Department of Education “found that few sectarian schools would join
voucher programs that allowed exemptions from religious instruction or activities.” Id.
143
Id.
144
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 712 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
145
393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969).
141
142
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unconstitutional for “civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of
interpreting and weighing church doctrine.”146 Presbyterian Church
involved a dispute over church property between two local churches and
the national denomination that turned on whether certain actions of the
latter “depart[ed] substantially” from church doctrine.147 If such a
departure was found, a second determination had to be made regarding
how significant the departures were to church doctrine. In other words,
the judiciary was asked “to determine matters at the very core of a
religion—the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion.”148 “Plainly,” the Court
declared, “the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a
role.”149
But is this not precisely the role Justice Souter is playing when he
claims that participation in the voucher program has compromised the
beliefs of the religious schools? Such a claim, after all, is a claim that the
schools have departed from church doctrine. To illustrate the point, let
us focus on Catholicism and the fact that at the time of the Zelman
litigation, thirty-five of the forty-six religious schools, out of a total of
fifty-six participating private schools enrolling voucher students, were
Catholic schools.150
To conclude that the Catholic schools had
compromised their religion, Justice Souter must compare the schools’
willingness to abide by the terms of the program against the teachings of
the Catholic Church. He must engage in theology to interpret and weigh
Catholic teachings, and he must do the same with religious traditions
and doctrines of other religious schools that accept voucher students.
However, as Presbyterian Church makes clear, the Free Exercise Clause
prevents courts from becoming embroiled in theological matters and
from attempting to tell the faithful how to understand their own faith.
Beyond this structural restraint denying the Supreme Court and all
civil courts the authority to act as theologians, we may also question
whether Justices and judges possess the knowledge and insight requisite
for theological undertakings. In other words, how does Justice Souter
know when a particular religious community has compromised its
principles? Is he or the Court generally so well-versed in the theologies
of the various religious traditions in this country that he or it is in a
position to say to a religious community that it has violated its own
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 451.
Id. at 450.
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450.
Id.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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principles? Justice Souter believes that the religious voucher schools in
Cleveland have compromised their principles in order to qualify for the
program. Undoubtedly, he would say the same of religious schools in
Milwaukee, which must abide by the more serious limitation that
permits voucher students to opt out of religious instruction and
activities. Such a conclusion contradicts the self-understanding of at
least the Catholic schools in Milwaukee, most of which are participating
in the voucher program.151 As the principal of one Milwaukee Catholic
high school stated, the opt-out provision did not interfere with the
school’s ability to “maintain [its] independence and [its] mission.”152
Thus, what may appear to an outsider, such as Justice Souter, to be a case
of a religious community compromising its beliefs in order to qualify for
public funds, may instead be nothing of the sort to the community.
Justice Souter aptly demonstrates that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken
to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or
the validity of [a] particular [believers’] interpretation[] of [their]
creeds.”153
One may reasonably doubt that Justice Souter actually practices
theology and that he does not interpret and evaluate religious principles
that would be necessary to conclude that religious voucher schools have
compromised their beliefs. That is, there is no evidence in his Zelman
opinion that he actually made any theological determinations, which is
just as well because he is not a theologian. Instead, the “compromise”
claim is a bald assertion that the faithful have been unfaithful and that
they have violated their religious beliefs. It is an accusation that the
religious have been unfaithful to their God and to what their God
requires of them. It is a very serious charge.154 But what leads Justice
Loconte, supra note 142, at 31.
Id. (quoting the principal).
153
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
154
Lest the reader think that I have exaggerated Justice Souter’s claim that the religious
have compromised their religious beliefs, reproduced below is the pertinent passage from
Zelman. In the founding era, Justice Souter writes, the corruption of religion was manifest
in:
‘[P]ride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the
laity[,] in both superstition, bigotry and persecution’; in the 21st
century, the risk is one of ‘corrosive secularism’ to religious schools,
and the specific threat is to the primacy of the schools’ mission to
educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts
of their faith. Even ‘the favored religion may be compromised as
political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it
may be reformed as government largesse brings government
regulation.’ The risk is already being realized . . . [in the Cleveland
program].
151
152
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Souter and the other Justices who joined his dissent to make such a
serious charge, especially when no evidence is offered to indicate that
voucher schools have compromised their faith? Justice Souter indicates
that the schools’ willingness to accept the restriction preventing them
from preferring same-faith students represents a compromise of belief.
However, as I have noted, he cannot know this without weighing and
evaluating the doctrines of the religion at issue, which he does not do
and he is forbidden to do. Consequently, he cannot know whether any
of the schools have compromised their beliefs by accepting the samefaith preference restriction. Why then the cavalier assertion that they
have? It seems to me that the claim is simply a form of moral badgering
intended to shame and condemn religious believers who would permit
their institutions to participate in neutral public programs. His aim
seems to be to discourage such participation and to instill in the public
consciousness the notion that religious institutions necessarily betray
their religion when they participate in neutral public programs. In the
end, Justice Souter’s motivations for the severe allegation he makes are
unclear. However, if the Constitution denies courts the authority to
“interpret[] and weigh[] church doctrine,”155 surely the Supreme Court
Justices should thus refrain from accusing the religious of betraying their
God.
As I noted above, the premise that policymakers may seek to
secularize religious institutions as a prerequisite to their participating in
neutral programs is a legitimate concern. However, I have argued that
by ignoring the threat the state’s monopoly on education funds presents
to religious belief, Justice Souter indicates that he does not truly
understand the secularization problem. Instead of chastising individuals
and groups who would seek to secularize religious schools, Justice
Souter adopts a deeply paternalistic stance that seeks to deny religious
schools the opportunity to participate in neutral educational programs.
Such paternalism is unwarranted because religious believers appear
quite capable of judging for themselves the threat that participation
presents to their religious beliefs. In addition to his paternalism, Justice
Souter’s concern about religious purity requires a theological
undertaking, which, in other contexts, the Court has acknowledged that
it is ill-equipped for and the First Amendment forbids.

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 712 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
155
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 451 (1969).
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C. Prevention of Social Conflict
The third pillar supporting the privatization commitment is the
claim that the Establishment Clause confines religion to the private
sphere because of “its inextricable link with social conflict.”156 To be
sure, this is a position “that once occupied the Court” but has now been
“rightly disregarded.”157 Nevertheless, those Justices committed to the
privatization of religion cling to it, arguing that religion in the public
sphere will lead to social conflict as religious groups vie for public funds
to support their institutions and as “taxpayers who take their liberty of
conscience seriously” mobilize to prevent such expenditures.158 As with
the concern over rights of conscience and the potential for religion to
become corrupted, social peace is certainly an important matter.
However, the problem is that the historical and social analysis offered in
support of the claim is wholly unpersuasive. In fact, it is perhaps an
overstatement to argue that the social conflict claim rests on any
meaningful analysis at all.
Although it is claimed that the prevention of religiously-motivated
social conflict is one of the aims of the Establishment Clause, it is
revealing that one finds no reference by any of the Justices espousing this
position to any original source. For example, Justice Souter cites only
other Supreme Court opinions, which fail to marshal any founding era
arguments.159 Moreover, as Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., argues, this
particular claim about the Establishment Clause is of recent vintage. 160
Gaffney documents that it was first hinted at by Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission161 in 1970. The next year,
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,162 a majority of the Court claimed it as one of the
motivations behind the adoption of the First Amendment.163 Writing for
the Court in Lemon, Chief Justice Burger argued that “political division
156
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718–22
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (presenting the same argument as Justice Souter with specific
attention to cases involving religion and education); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 872
(2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (briefly recounting cases in which the Court has invoked the
religious strife rationale).
157
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 825 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
158
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159
See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 872 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
160
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The
Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205
(1980).
161
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
162
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
163
Gaffney, supra note 160, at 209–12.
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along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect.”164 As Gaffney notes, neither
Justice Harlan nor Chief Justice Burger reference any founding era
arguments or sources in support of their assertion about the intent of the
Establishment Clause.165 Instead, both rely on a 1969 Harvard Law
Review article, which itself is “unadorned with any reference to primary
sources.”166 After reviewing congressional debates over the First
Amendment and the writings of Jefferson and Madison, Gaffney argues
that the historical record cannot bear the weight of the social conflict
claim. The historical record, Gaffney writes, is devoid of evidence
indicating that “the founding fathers perceived political divisions along
religious lines as an evil and that they intended to avoid such conflicts by
enacting the First Amendment.”167 Given that the Establishment Clause
appears to be a jurisdictional statement explicitly affirming that the new
Constitution did not withdraw from the states’ authority
over
religion,168 it is not surprising that Gaffney would reach this conclusion.
Not only does the alleged prevention-of-social-conflict motivation
for the Establishment Clause lack a credible historical foundation, as
social policy it is a solution in search of a problem. That is, religion has
had a place in the public sphere throughout our nation’s history, and it
has engendered no deep or enduring social conflict. Consider only the
post-New Deal American political culture. As Justice O’Connor points
out in her Zelman concurrence, substantial public funds have long been
channeled to religious institutions “through public health programs such
as Medicare . . . and Medicaid . . . through educational programs such as
the Pell Grant program . . . and the G.I. Bill of Rights . . . and through
childcare programs such as the Child Care and Development Block
Grant Program.”169
Religious institutions have additionally long

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
Gaffney, supra note 160, at 210, 214.
166
Id. at 214. (referring to Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1680 (1969)).
167
Id. at 223. Gaffney adds that not only can Madison not be put into service for the
political divisiveness rationale, but that Madison actually encouraged, both theoretically
and practically, religiously-motivated political divisions. In support of this argument,
Gaffney cites Madison’s argument in Federalist No. 10 that civil and religious liberty would
be safeguarded by competition among different “interests” and “sects.” Further, Gaffney
notes that in his battle to defeat Patrick Henry’s bill to support the teaching of Christianity,
Madison “explicitly appealed to a wide coalition of religious dissidents in Virginia,
principally Baptists and Presbyterians, to oppose the views of the established Episcopalian
Church. . . .” Id. at 222.
168
See supra note 73.
169
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666–68 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
164
165
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benefited, albeit indirectly, from tax policies permitting tax deductions
for contributions made to qualified religious organizations, education
policies establishing tax credits for educational expenses, including those
incurred at religious schools, and exemptions from state property taxes
for property owned by religious institutions.170 The annual value of the
foregoing benefits is well into the billions of dollars,171 but one is hard
pressed to identify any divisive political conflict provoked by these
examples of religion in the public sphere.172
Consequently, just as the claim that the founders intended the
Establishment Clause to be a safeguard against religiously-motivated
political divisiveness is free of any founding era references or arguments,
the arguments about the divisiveness of religion in the public sphere are
likewise free of any meaningful American examples of religiouslymotivated political divisions. Rather, there are the standard references
to seventeenth century European religious conflicts and the established
churches in colonial America that persisted into the nineteenth
century.173 The state-established churches in the late 1700s and early
1800s were politically divisive, but these conflicts are inapposite to the
evaluation of the divisiveness of religious institutions participating in
religiously-neutral public programs within the context of an expansive
regulatory state. If religiously-motivated social conflict were truly a
problem requiring the privatization of religion, one would expect to find
examples of it accompanying the public programs noted in the preceding
paragraph wherein billions of public dollars have directly and indirectly
aided religion.
The lack of meaningful American examples of religious conflict
explains why Justice Souter and other privatization Justices do not
reference any, and this perhaps helps us to understand why Justice
Stevens now also looks to contemporary international conflicts to
Id. at 665–66 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 665–68.
172
Noting this, Bradley wrote—in 1986, when the divisiveness rationale commanded the
support of a majority of Justices—that the:
Court is clearly engaged in an entirely prophylactic effort, one that has
constitutionalized the relationship of church to state without any
empirical confirmation of the “evil” that assertedly justifies it.
Requiring just a “clear and present danger” of sectarian strife, for
instance, would eliminate the “divisiveness” rationale from every case
that ever employed it.
Bradley, supra note 1, at 303.
173
See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
170
171
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support his claim that religion must be confined to the private sphere.
That is, Justice Stevens’s opposition to religion in the public sphere is
based not only on his “understanding of the impact of religious strife on
the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this continent” but also on
“the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the
Middle East to mistrust one another.”174 One wonders which is the more
curious, Justice Stevens’s reduction of complex political, ethnic, and
religious differences to simply religious disputes or his belief that the
political strife in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East is
somehow instructive for gauging the constitutionality of neutral, public,
American programs.
My comments here should not be understood as an uncritical,
unqualified endorsement of religion in the public square or as a denial
that religion holds any potential for social harm. Clearly it does. Human
history is replete with instances of great evil committed in the name of
religion.175 My contention is simply that religion has always had some
involvement in the public sphere in this country and yet the American
experience has been one largely free of serious, lasting religious conflict.
This claim is reinforced, I believe, by the failure of the privatization
Justices to identify any consequential American examples of such
divisiveness.
One might concede my point about the American history of many
religions and of no religion living together more or less peacefully but
argue that religious school vouchers, as in Zelman, are different. For
instance, one could claim that the lack of any serious social conflict over
neutral tax, higher education, healthcare, and childcare policies is
uninstructive for evaluating the potential political divisiveness of school
choice programs. This is essentially Justice Breyer’s position, who
concedes that the “consequence [of religion in the public sphere] has not
been great turmoil” but argues that “[s]chool voucher programs
differ . . . in both kind and degree from” other types of neutral aid
programs.176 Vouchers differ in kind because they “direct financing to a
core function of the church: the teaching of religious truths to young
children,” which is “far more contentious than providing funding for
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 297–318 (2001) (focusing largely on the issue of schooling).
See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 191-478 (2002)
(recounting fierce anti-Catholicism surrounding schooling and other public policy debates
from the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth century).
176
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174
175
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secular textbooks, computers, vocational training, or even funding for
adults who wish to obtain a college education at a religious
university.”177 He also contends, without referencing any historical
examples, that “history also shows that government involvement in
religious primary education is far more divisive” than any tax or
healthcare programs that happen to benefit religion.178 Vouchers differ
in degree from other aid programs the Court has endorsed in that other
programs provided only “limited amounts of aid,” whereas vouchers
involve “a considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from public secular
schools to private religious schools.”179
While Justice Breyer is correct about how vouchers differ from other
types of public aid, it is unclear that vouchers will generate any more
political division—that is to say, any political division—than have the
more limited aid programs the Court has approved of in recent years.180
This of course is not to say that vouchers are uncontroversial or that
some segments of American society do not ardently resist them, but that
the divisiveness reasoning is fundamentally flawed and has been since it
was first articulated in 1970. It is flawed because the public debate over
public aid to religious schools is not about religion or religious truths.
Instead, it is a debate about political principles—chiefly, what justice and
equality require regarding schooling in a free society.181 Essentially, the
disagreement over public aid to religious schools implicates no religious
values, only political values. It is a political dispute carried on by
ordinary political means. What advocates of school vouchers and other
aid programs seek is not the establishment of a religious truth or some
religious orthodoxy, but an end to the state’s monopoly over education
funds. As Gerard Bradley argues, the issue of public aid to religious
schools “has never been agitated in a way distinguishable from political
conflict generally, and the Court has done nothing except assert, without
a scintilla of evidence, the contrary.”182 To be sure, religion is in the
background, but in a religious society such as ours, religion is in the
background of virtually every political issue. Yet, does not the American
experience confirm that individuals and groups of different religions and
Id. at 726–27.
Id. at 727.
179
Id.
180
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
181
See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); STEPHEN MACEDO,
DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000);
Kevin Pybas, Liberalism and Civic Education: Unitary Versus Pluralist Alternatives, 33 PERSP.
ON POL. SCI. 18 (2004).
182
Bradley, supra note 1, at 304.
177
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of no religion are capable of living together more or less peacefully? This
point seems conceded by the failure of the privatization Justices to point
to any meaningful American examples of religiously-motivated political
strife and by Justice Breyer’s acknowledgement that no previous aid
program has generated any such conflict.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Souter and other Justices stubbornly insist that the aim of the
Establishment Clause is to restrict religion to the private sphere. The
arguments in support of this conclusion, respecting the rights of
conscience, preventing the corruption of religion, and preserving social
peace, are unpersuasive. It is my contention that analysis of these issues
by the privatization Justices is largely perfunctory and that no real
examination of the issues takes place. Instead of a meaningful analysis
of religious liberty, the privatization thesis rests upon the following: (1)
conclusory statements about rights of conscience, including a misreading
of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance;183 (2) a misguided paternalism
requiring the Court to weigh and evaluate religious doctrines, which
ignores the threat that the state’s monopolization of public education
funds presents to religion and wrongly assumes that religious
institutions participating in neutral government programs are incapable
of safeguarding their faith;184 and (3) seeks to protect the nation from a
religiously-inspired social conflict, which is largely an imaginary
problem.185
To further illustrate the thinness of the claim that the Establishment
Clause banishes religion to the private sphere, consider the treatment of
“public sphere” and “private sphere” by the privatization Justices.
Interpreting the Establishment Clause to require that religion be
restricted to the private sphere follows this syllogism:
The Establishment Clause embodies Jefferson’s A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom and Madison’s Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. These
texts reflect the belief that religion should be confined to
the private sphere. No public funds may therefore be
used for religious purposes, even when such funds reach
religious institutions only as a result of the free and
independent choices of aid recipients.
183
184
185

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
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The problem with this syllogism is: The easy assumption of the minor
premise that the term “private sphere” has the same meaning today as it
did for Jefferson and Madison. Insofar as I can determine, the Supreme
Court has never explicitly defined what it means by the use of “private
sphere” and “public sphere.” However, it seems that the Court equates
government and its activities with the public sphere and that the private
sphere consists of those areas of life that government has not wholly
regulated. In essence, the private sphere consists of the aspects of life
where we are relatively unconstrained to live according to our own best
lights.
If we understand “public sphere” to mean nothing more than
whatever government does, as the Supreme Court seems to interpret it,
then it is axiomatic that the public sphere has come to dwarf the private
sphere. The privatization Justices thus trivialize religion by refusing to
confront this fact. Jefferson and Madison understood their principles as
expanding the sphere of human liberty. In contrast, crudely insisting
that religion must be limited to the private sphere in contemporary
circumstances of an expansive managerial state reduces the sphere of
human liberty. Consider only the example of public aid to religious
schools, which comprises much of the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. All citizens are taxed for the benefit of education, but
under the privatization of religion interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, religious schools are denied any meaningful public support.
Government schools alone are entitled to the educational tax proceeds.
Such a scheme clearly results in a reduction of liberty for families who
wish to provide their children an education unavailable in state schools.
To be sure, such families have the liberty to send their children to
religious schools,186 but the privatization principle denies them the
opportunity to draw on the educational fund to which they have
contributed.
It is thus rather formalistic and crude to reflexively demand that
religion be confined to the private sphere without contextually
considering whether liberty will be promoted or impeded.187 The
unwillingness to wrestle with such a crucial issue is emblematic of the
refusal of those Justices who seek to confine religion to the private
sphere to seriously engage difficult issues of religious liberty. The

See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
I am not suggesting that the restraint of liberty is always illegitimate. Human liberty
is restrained in various ways in liberal society, generally in the service of some broader
social good.
186
187
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casualness with which these Justices claim that the Constitution requires
religion to be restricted to the private sphere suggests almost an
eagerness to constrain religion. Instead of the result of a careful
constitutional inquiry, the conclusion that religion must be confined to
the private sphere seems indicative of an a priori negative judgment
about religion—as something unimportant, possibly dangerous, and
requiring no serious analysis.188 Particularly underscoring this point is
the fact that privatization Justices seem incapable of drawing any
favorable conclusions from religion’s long involvement in the public
sphere, an association without lasting social conflict.189 Refusing to
notice this, they dogmatically insist that religion must be confined to the
private sphere to avoid a largely nonexistent problem.
In criticizing the privatization claim, I should not be understood as
advocating any particular boundary between religion and the state. I
hope to have shown that the privatization thesis is remarkably
unpersuasive, as it has little to do with either founding era arguments
188
In a manuscript in progress, I suggest that the belief that religion must be confined to
the private sphere is part of a comprehensive philosophical commitment about religion,
individual, and social flourishing that is rooted in an understanding of the liberal political
tradition that William Galston calls “autonomy-centered.” See supra note 11. Autonomycentered liberalism, Galston argues, promotes “individual self-direction in at least one of
many senses explored by John Locke, Immanual Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Americans
writing in an Emersonian vein [and] is frequently linked with the commitment to sustained
rational examination of self, others, and social practices.” GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 21
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). Autonomy-centered liberalism is:
[L]inked to an historical impulse often associated with the
Enlightenment—namely, liberation through reason from externally
imposed authority. Within this context, reason is understood as the
prime source of authority; the examined life is understood as superior
to reliance on tradition or faith; preference is to be given to selfdirection over external determination; and appropriate relationships to
conceptions of good or of value, and especially conceptions that
constitute groups, are held to originate only through acts of conscious
individual reflection on and commitment to such conceptions.
Id. at 24. Galston argues further that a number of cultural and political conflicts today are
the result of “the decision to throw state power behind the promotion of individual
autonomy,” which tends to “undermine individuals and groups that do not and cannot
organize their affairs in accordance with that principle without undermining the deepest
sources of their identity.” Id. The promotion of autonomy places the coercive powers of
the state behind a partisan conception of the good life. The state “takes sides in the
ongoing struggle between reason and faith, reflection and tradition. Autonomy-based
arguments are bound to marginalize those individuals and groups who cannot
conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment impulse.” Id. at 25–26. Autonomy-centered
liberalism thus fails to take diversity seriously, and it often leads liberal societies to act “in
ways that reduce diversity.” William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516,
522 (1995).
189
See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text.
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that brought the Establishment Clause into existence or with an
informed awareness that religion has been for the most part peacefully
involved in the public sphere since the nation’s founding. However, this
does not mean that the state should promote religion with, for instance,
official prayers and scripture readings in the public schools. Rather, the
point is that an uncritical commitment to confining religion to the private
sphere leads Justice Souter and other Justices to hurry past, if not ignore,
complex issues of religious liberty. Instead of a searching inquiry into
how religious liberty can be protected for all amidst deep religious
diversity and an ever-expanding regulatory state, we get abstract,
conclusory arguments about the purported meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Wherever the just boundary between religion and
state may lie, neither our confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to
mark it nor the cause of religious liberty itself is furthered by dogmatic
assertions that the Constitution requires religion to be confined to the
private sphere.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/3

